

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY


by

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
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
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
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Table of Contents

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
Introduction	iii
I. How It All Began: Background of European Union Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) And The European Security And Defense Identity (ESDI).....	1
A. Origins Of The EURRF And ESDI	1
B. Origin, Composition, And Command Structure Of The EURRF	4
C. Other European Force Structures/Security Arrangements	8
D. Brief, Selected, Western European Country Perspectives/ Status	12
II. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) And Its Relation To ESDI	24
A. NATO Initiatives.....	24
B. Linkage Between NATO, CFSP, ESDI, And EURRF	27
III. ESDI Enhancers And Detractors From European Integration And Cooperation.....	31
A. Some Educated Perspectives: Practitioners And Scholars.....	31
B. Has ESDI, The EURRF, And NATO Expansion Contributed To European And International Cooperation?.....	33
C. Has ESDI, The EURRF, And NATO Expansion Detracted From European And International Cooperation?.....	38
IV. Case Studies In Force Compatibility, Language, Procurement, And Regional Stability And NATO/ EU Integration Problems	41
V. Conclusions- Making Sense Of It All	57
Bibliography	60

Introduction

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1990, it has been argued that the world has entered a different era. Seemingly overnight, the world went from a bi-polar security environment to a uni-polar security environment. Accordingly, many European and American decision-making elites, as well as a majority of taxpayers on both sides of the Atlantic, began to question the need for large security Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, Americans began to wonder why the United States was still “bank-rolling” European defense. Conversely, Europeans began to wonder why they could not defend themselves without a large American presence within their security decision-making apparatus. Hence, on both sides of the Atlantic, a movement for a viable European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) took on a new impetus. Of course, the nature of the world being what it is- i.e., nothing is simple or very rarely appears as it is, there were bound to be significant issues arising from ESDI and its intersection with NATO viability and concerns.

The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to explore the problems arising from an emergent European Union Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) within the context of ESDI, a subset of the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP. In accordance with CFSP, by 2003, the member states of the European Union (EU) are to be capable of deploying 50,000-60,000 soldiers (with a discussed/ possible upgrade to 100,000), the EURRF within sixty

days, and sustain them for a year in support of combat operations, operations other than war, and/or humanitarian assistance missions. The deployed force could be under EU command and operate independently of NATO. Because most of the member countries are also members of NATO, this fact raises an interesting basic question: To what extent, and why, is the EU acquiring or adopting a military capability and posture seemingly independent of NATO, or is it developing within or alongside NATO?

Additionally, in the context of the United States (US), which is the de-facto leader of NATO because of its overwhelming stand-alone military capability and technological advantages, this EURRF poses a challenge. Most member states of the EU are members of NATO. However, several major countries are members of the EU but not NATO, such as France, and other countries are members of NATO and not the EU, such as Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, creating a possible Alliance dilemma. This fact, combined with the likely need for the EURRF to operate with European manufactured weapons and communications systems, poses a potential sticking point within the NATO Alliance, as well as with US Foreign Policy. Thus, the second question is: How will a EURRF, within ESDI and CFSP, impact NATO and US Foreign Policy?

Furthermore, while the EU is expanding and enhancing its military capabilities under ESDI, this phenomenon creates the conditions for both cooperation and competition within a number of fields, particularly in the security arena, which encompasses national defense policies, military capabilities and structures, and the European defense industry as a whole. Therefore, this paper

shall also attempt to answer the following additional questions. First, to what extent does the ESDI enhance or detract from European integration and cooperation? Second, if it enhances, in what manner does it do so, and what lessons can be learned? Conversely, if it detracts, why does it detract, and what are possible realistic solutions, as well as lessons that can be learned? Finally, does ESDI enhance or detract from NATO enlargement and where, and in what context, do they intersect?

Finally, it is important to remember that CFSP, ESDI, the EURRF, and NATO are currently evolving. Therefore, the research contained within this paper, although factual, is in some areas pieced together from varying sources, namely the composition of the EURRF and its evolving command structures and interface with NATO. Additionally, although it appears that CFSP, ESDI, and the EURRF are designed to be separable from NATO, this paper will demonstrate that this may be a desire with some elements of the European Community, but it has a long way to go, and complicates the European security environment both within NATO and external to NATO. Furthermore, on-going debates about the EU, CFSP, and the EURRF are evolving, for the development of an ESDI, if not within NATO, then parallel to it due to a number of factors. Finally, formal US foreign policy in the future should continue to be the promotion of both NATO and CFSP, as long as the viability of NATO is preserved, and US interests are maintained. Unfortunately, as this paper will demonstrate, this is easier said than done.

I. How It All Began: Background of European Union Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) And The European Security And Defense Identity (ESDI)

A. Origins Of The EURRF And ESDI

In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was signed and established the CFSP as “the second of the three pillars of the new European Union.”¹ (The other two pillars being: Economic and Monetary Union, EMU, and police and criminal law cooperation, or jurisprudence.²) Then, in June 1999, the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) was implemented by the European Council at Cologne, Germany, to supplement CFSP.³ CFSP allows the European Union to “make its voice heard on the international stage, express its position on armed conflicts, human rights, and any other subject linked to the ...common values which form the basis of the European Union and which it is committed to defend.”⁴ It was intended to do this “via an ESDI built through a revitalized Western European Union (WEU).”⁵ CESDP allowed for the transference of power from the WEU to the EU in the area of crisis management as detailed in the Petersburg Tasks, which are now incorporated into the Treaty

¹ Bredow, Wilfried Von, Thomas Jager, and Gerhard Kummel, eds., *European Security* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, Inc.) 1997, p. 10.

² *The Three Pillars of The EU*. Accessed at website www.eu2001.se on 04 April 2002, p. 1.

³ *New Roles In European Security*. Accessed at www.european-defence.co.uk/article8.html on 21 March 2002, p. 1.

⁴ *Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy*. Accessed at www.ue.eu.int on 20 April 2002, p. 1.

⁵ Kay, Sean, *NATO and The Future of European Security*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.) 1998, p. 128.

of The European Union.⁶ In December 1999, this was confirmed at the EU Helsinki Summit where “it was decided that the crisis management function would be established within the EU and that a rapid reaction force would be enacted by 2003, as well as the political and military structures to support such a force.”⁷ Furthermore, “the provisions on...CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty [in...] May 1999,” and “articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on European Union are...devoted specifically to...CFSP.”⁸

CFSP is also important for another reason, the Treaty of Nice. The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and “contains new CFSP provisions.”⁹ Among these are the following revisions to The Treaty on European Union and the treaties establishing the European Communities and related acts:

1. Article 17. “The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.”

2. Article 17.4. “The provisions of this article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this title.”

3. Article 24.2. “The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers an issue for the adoption of internal decisions.”

⁶ *New Roles In European Security*, p. 1. Petersburg Tasks are as follows: humanitarian and rescue missions; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. (From Brassey's Inc. *European Security Institutions: Ready for The Twenty-First Century?* (Everett, MA: Fidelity Press) 2000, p. 36.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ *Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy*, p. 1.

⁹ Ibid.

4. Article 24.3. "When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a joint action or common position, the Council shall act by qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2)." ¹⁰

The bottom line of all the above, is that CFSP decisions are usually taken unanimously, however, there are two options available for making military and defense decisions easier.¹¹ The first is "constructive abstention," where a decision is adopted by the EU and a member state may "couple its abstention with a formal declaration," as it recognizes that the decision is binding on the Union.¹² The second is the use of qualified majority voting. This is utilized when the EU Council "implements common strategies decided on by the European Council and to decisions on the implementation of joint actions and common positions."¹³ However, "when a decision is adopted by qualified majority, a member state may...invoke important...stated reasons of national policy...to oppose the adoption of the text" and "a vote will...not be taken."¹⁴ In the case of CFSP policies "for adoption, acts require 62 votes in favor cast by at least 10 members."¹⁵ Furthermore, in accordance with the Nice Treaty, "enhanced cooperation" is possible when at least eight member states, in the position to do so, agree to act in concert in relation to the "implementation of a joint action or a common position, to arms initiatives or to security and defense initiatives, contributing to the acquisition of crisis management capabilities."¹⁶ Additionally, any EURRF "deployment depends on the willingness of [the participating] nations

¹⁰ *Treaty of Nice*. In "The Official Journal of The European Union," 2001/C 80/01, p. 1. Accessed at www.europa.eu.int on 30 April 01.

¹¹ *Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy*, p. 9.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

to contribute forces to a particular operation.”¹⁷ Finally, EU member countries aligned with NATO shall be allowed to adhere to their NATO commitments.

B. Origin, Composition, and Command Structure Of The EURRF

“The EU force [EURRF] is not a European Army in the sense of a standing army.”¹⁸ Its origins can be traced back to the Elysee Treaty of 1963 signed by French President de Gaulle and German Chancellor Adenauer.¹⁹ The aim of this treaty was “enhancing reconciliation between France and Germany” through collaboration on defense issues, political consultation, the exchange of officers, and “cooperation in the defense industry.”²⁰ This tacit cooperation continued for 25 years.²¹ In 1987, France and Germany decided to form a Security and Defense Council or SDC, “which would allow for better coordination on joint Franco-German operations as part of the WEU and, later, NATO.”²² Three years later, in 1991, both countries decided to put weight behind the SDC and created the Franco-German Brigade that answered directly to the EU, WEU, and, later, NATO in 1993.²³ Once it became linked to NATO, it was redesignated as the Eurocorps.²⁴

Since the European Council’s 1999 Helsinki “Headline Goal,” (the ability to deploy by the year 2003, 60,000 personnel within sixty days and sustain them up

¹⁷ Brassey’s Inc., *European Security Institutions: Ready for The Twenty-First Century?* (Everett, MA: Fidelity Press) 2000, p. 71.

¹⁸ *A European Army?* Accessed at www.european-defense.co.uk on 21 March 2002, p. 3.

¹⁹ *The Origins.* Accessed at www.eurocorps.org on 30 April 2002, p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

to a year) the Eurocorps has evolved as the heart of the EURRF.²⁵ With its headquarters in Strasbourg, Germany, the Eurocorps is composed of troops from five member countries-France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg.²⁶ In addition to this, it was decided in 2000 at the "Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, Belgium," to expand the EURRF to consist of "100,000 troops, up to 400 combat aircraft and naval elements."²⁷ In addition to the five official member countries of the Eurocorps, the United Kingdom, Holland, Italy, Austria, Greece, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland promised to commit forces if called upon.²⁸ Additionally, "Denmark has not committed troops to the force, but will provide them if the need arises."²⁹ (The breakdown below, as best discerned, in Table I depicts this force structure.³⁰)

Table I				
Eurocorps	Units	Eurocorps (Countries Promising Forces)		Promised Personnel
France - Germany	Franco-German Brigade	United Kingdom		12,500
Germany (13,500)	10 th Armored Division: 12 Armored Brigade; 30 th Mechanized Brigade	Italy		6,000
France (12,000)	EMF2 (Etat-Major de forces Nr2): One Armored Brigade; One Mechanized Infantry Brigade; Support Units As Needed (Note: Unit Designations Not Specified!)	Holland		5,000
		Austria		2,000
		Portugal		1,000
Spain (6,000)	1 st Mechanized Division: 10 th Mechanized Brigade; 11 th Mechanized Brigade; 12 th Armored Brigade	Greece		3,500
		Finland		2,000
Belgium (1,000)	Operational Command Land: 1 st Mechanized Brigade; 7 th Mechanized Brigade; 17 th Mechanized brigade	Sweden		1,500
		Ireland		1,000
Luxembourg (100)	Reconnaissance Company (180 soldiers)	-Denmark- no forces committed but will provide if necessary		
Total:	If all forces committed 60,000	Total Above:	34,500	Grand Total: 94,500
Note: Under Eurocorps: It is not clear whether the numbers listed, in bold, below the countries in the left-hand column are inclusive of numbers/units promised to Eurocorps or in addition to the numbers/units committed to Eurocorps. This discrepancy shall be discussed later.				

²⁵ *Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy*, p. 2.

²⁶ *Directory*. Accessed at www.eurocorps.org on 30 April 2002, p. 1.

²⁷ *New Roles In European Security*, pp. 1-2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ The information for Table I was compiled from: *New Roles In European Security*, p. 2; *A European Army?*, p. 3; *Subordinate Units*, Accessed at www.eurocorps.org on 30 April 2002, p. 1.

With the expansion of the EURRF to 100,000 troops, the command structure of the Eurocorps and its linkage to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is complicated and ambiguous. In peacetime, the EU only controls the EUMS, the Franco-German Brigade at Mulleheim, Germany, and the "Multinational Command Support Brigade (MNCS Bde), with its headquarters at Strasbourg."³¹ (It is important to note that the MNCS headquarters element, only, is at Strasbourg and operational; all other units "do not actually belong to the Brigade, but will be provided by...nations on a case by case basis."³²) By agreement, the commander, deputy commander, and chief of staff of the Eurocorps are always German, Belgian, and Spanish, respectively.³³ The Eurocorps, as best discerned, is linked to the European Council through the EUMS to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and then the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is subordinate to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which in turn is subordinate to the General Affairs Council, which in turn answers to the European Council.³⁴ The EUMC "is the highest military body established within the council."³⁵ The PSC branches laterally to the Secretary-General/High Representative, Javier Solana, who is in turn in charge of the EU Policy Unit and Situation Center.³⁶ Currently, the EUMS is slated for command by Lt-Gen Klaus Schuwith of Germany, with Maj-Gen

³¹From *Subordinate Units and Multinational Command Support Brigade*. Accessed at www.eurocorps.org on 30 April 2002, p. 2 and p. 1, respectively.

³²*Multinational Command Support Brigade*, p. 1.

³³*HQ Eurocorps*. Accessed at www.eurocorps.org on 30 April 2002, p. 1.



³⁴*New Roles In European Security*, p. 2-3.

³⁵*EU Military Structures*. Accessed at www.ue.eu.int on 01 February 2002, p. 1.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 3.

Messevy-Whiting of the United Kingdom as his deputy.³⁷ The charts below depict the EU Crisis Chain of Command and the Eurocorps Structure, respectively.³⁸

**BASIC OUTLINE OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT
COMMAND CHAIN**



Note: EC= European Council; X= Brigade; XX= Division; XXX= Corps; OPCOM=Operational Command; as depicted approx. 60,000 soldiers if all countries contribute.

It is important to note that within the Eurocorps proper, meaning the five permanent member countries, and with the additional countries that have promised to commit to the new 100,000 soldiers EURRF, each individual state has the option to provide or withdraw forces. "National state control of armed forces remains too much of an important issue for all governments."³⁹ In addition, the Eurocorps is linked to NATO through a Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Agreement, signed in 1993, that stipulates that the Eurocorps shall adopt "NATO structures and procedures, thus facilitating its rapid integration into NATO in case of commitment," and stipulates "Eurocorps'

³⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

³⁸ Left chart from *New Roles In European Security*, p. 3. Right chart from *Subordinate Units and Multinational Command Support Brigade*. Accessed at www.eurocorps.org on 30 April 2002, p. 2.

³⁹ *A European Army?*, p. 3.

missions within NATO.”⁴⁰ Additionally, the European Council has decided that CFSP, and resultantly the EURRF, must not be deployed if it prejudices NATO.⁴¹ To this end, “permanent arrangements have been agreed for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation. Meetings between the Union and NATO are held on a regular basis in certain specific fields...to launch [where necessary] using NATO assets and capabilities.”⁴² Finally, the four-star general officer, designated to command the European Military Committee, not only participates as appropriate in the EU PSC, but also in NATO’s Military Committee.⁴³

C. Other European Force Structures/Security Arrangements

In addition to CFSP, ESDI, and the EURRF, there are four other major European security arrangements that must be discussed, as they predate, in some ways, the evolving EURRF and therefore warrant discussion. These are EUROFOR- European Rapid Deployment Force, EUROMARFOR- European Maritime Force, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe- OSCE and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council- EAPC.⁴⁴ EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR are exclusively European. OSCE and EAPC contain the extra European members of Canada, the United States, and The Holy See (Vatican).⁴⁵

⁴⁰ *Basic Documents*. Accessed at www.eurocorps.org on 30 April 2002, p. 2.

⁴¹ *Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy*, p. 2.


⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Howorth, Jolyon, *Chaillot Paper 43- European Integration And Defense: The Ultimate Challenge*. (Alencon, France: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union) 2000, p. 18.

⁴⁴ Duke, Simon, *The Elusive Quest for European Security*. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, Inc.) 2000. pp. 245, 273, xv, xvi.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

The chart below, "Figure 7.2: The Evolving European Security Structure," from *The Elusive Quest for European Security*, depicts this⁴⁶:



As the preceding chart depicts, OSCE "is the most inclusive organization devoted to European security."⁴⁷ Furthermore, it is "the only security institution or organization in Europe that is considered a regional arrangement under Chapter 8 of the United Nations (UN) charter."⁴⁸ It was formed in 1973 as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE. The name was then changed in 1994/1995 to OSCE because of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and European integration.⁴⁹ OSCE's priorities include: consolidating member "states' common values and...building democratic civil societies," preventing "local conflicts" and restoring peace, and avoiding "real and perceived security deficits...to avoid the creation [of] new political, economic, or

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Szayna, Thomas S., *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Distribution Services) 2001, p. 27.

⁴⁸ Brassey's Inc., p. 118.

⁴⁹ OSCE Handbook. Accessed at www.osce.org on 16 March 2002, pp. viii-17.

social divisions by promoting a cooperative system of security.”⁵⁰ It is important because Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is wary of its former Warsaw Pact states becoming members of NATO, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, or in the future, former Soviet Republics, such as the Ukraine, joining NATO.⁵¹ However, OSCE lacks “institutional enforcement power,” and must rely on the EU, UN, and/or NATO for backing.⁵² Furthermore, all 55-member states are counted as equals and one country can veto a resolution or an action, thus, making it a highly inefficient decision-making body.⁵³

The next major organization is EAPC. EAPC “is a consultative body set up as a forum for deliberations on security issues in Europe and former Soviet space.”⁵⁴ It was formed by NATO in 1991 “with the Baltic states among its founders,” and was “formerly known as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.”⁵⁵ EAPC meets twice per year and allows “NATO and its Cooperation Partners” to discuss “security related matters” such as: “crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defense issues; international terrorism...security impact of economic developments.”⁵⁶ It is significant because both France and Italy perceived that the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech-Republic into NATO, even with

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

⁵¹ Bredow, Wilfried Von, Thomas Jager, and Gerhard Kummel, eds., *European Security*. (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, Inc.) 1997, p. 216.

⁵² Brassey's Inc., p. 118.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 118-119, 139-140.

⁵⁴ Szayna, p. 27.

⁵⁵ Eden, Douglas, ed., *Europe and The Atlantic Relationship: Issues of Identity, Security, and Power*. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, Inc.) 2000, p. 22.

⁵⁶ NATO, *The NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*. (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press) 1998-1999, pp. 84-85.

the exclusion of Romania and Slovenia, would push NATO's "center of gravity eastwards."⁵⁷ Furthermore, EAPC "is likely to become the mechanism through which all NATO-led peace support operations will be coordinated."⁵⁸ Finally, because of "Ukrainian and Russian multi-level consultations...and the enhanced...dialogue...of 28 [new] member(s)," the enhanced strain on NATO is perceived as overwhelming by many.⁵⁹

The third organization that must be considered is EUROFOR. "In December 1993, shortly after the Eurocorps-WEU linkage was formalized, Italy, together with France and Spain, proposed the creation of *Euro-force Operationelle Rapide* [EUROFOR]."⁶⁰ EUROFOR was to have a brigade attached from each of the three member states (Italy, Spain, France) that when deployed, would equal a division or "roughly 10,000 troops."⁶¹ It was intended to operate within the "Mediterranean theatre of operations at the behest of the WEU."⁶² With its headquarters in Florence, Italy, EUROFOR counts Portugal, France, Spain, and Italy as members.⁶³ However, it is just that, a divisional headquarters, it "has no pre-assigned forces."⁶⁴

Finally, was EUROMARFOR developed because of the establishment EUROFOR and its requirement for amphibious forces?⁶⁵ "EUROMARFOR was

⁵⁷ Eden, p. 22.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 88.

⁵⁹ Duke, p. 154.

⁶⁰ Gregory, Shaun, *French Defense Policy Into The Twenty-First Century*. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, LLC) 2000, p. 137.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Borawski, John and Thomas-Durell Young, *NATO After 2000: The Future of The EURO-Atlantic Alliance*. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers) 2001, p. 30.

⁶⁴ From Broawski, p. 30, and Duke, p. 245.

⁶⁵ Gregory, p. 137.

inaugurated on 2 October 1995 at Rota, in Spain, and developed thereafter in tandem with EUROFOR based on the participation of the original three states together with Portugal.”⁶⁶ EUROMARFOR, unlike EUROFOR, consists “of pre-structured packages and substantially enhances naval cooperation in Europe” outside NATO.⁶⁷

The significance of all the above organizations is that they impact not only European-NATO relations, but also EU relations as well. This shall become readily apparent in the following sections.

D. Brief, Selected, Western European Country Perspectives/Status

The following countries, France, United Kingdom (UK), Germany, Belgium, and Spain, have been selected for study because of their relevance. France, the UK, and Germany have been selected, as they are the three most dominant actors in the EU. Belgium was selected because it contains NATO headquarters and is a country that borders Germany and France. Spain has been selected because of its relationship with NATO and previously stated security arrangements with France. France and the UK are discussed at length as their opposing viewpoints represent the two major arguments in the discussion of ESDI. The other countries are intentionally covered more briefly to bring out only a few salient points.

-France and The United Kingdom (UK):

It is practical, at this point, to discuss France and the UK jointly because both are bound together, yet on opposite ends of the spectrum over

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ 1st part of sentence from Duke, p. 245, and second part from Gregory, p. 137.

ESDI/CFSP.⁶⁸ In December 1998, France and the UK reached a settlement over ESDI at St. Malo, France.⁶⁹ They declared their commitment to “unite...[their] efforts to enable the [EU] to give concrete expression to [the] objectives...” of CFSP.⁷⁰ Furthermore, they declared “Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to...new risks, and which are supported by strong and competitive European defense and technology.”⁷¹

The significance of St. Malo cannot be understated. It was here that ESDI took a new turn. First, the UK, at the urging of Prime Minister Tony Blair, removed its long-standing opposition to joining a EU security structure. However, Mr. Blair’s motives were more to save the NATO Alliance by having a say in European affairs and by having a direct political link with France.⁷² This position was evidenced in a speech given in March 2001, where Mr. Blair stated: “If we [the UK] don’t get involved in European defense...[t]hen those people who really may have an agenda to destroy NATO will have control of it.”⁷³

Similarly, in March 2001, the French position was made clear. The senior general of the French Army, General Kleche, stated “that the [EURRF] must have its own command structure independent of NATO,” and that even though France is committed to NATO, there was no need to go through NATO for operational engagement/approval.⁷⁴ Thus, he was expressing French President Jacques Chirac’s position of a EU force operating independently of NATO, but in

⁶⁸ Howorth, p. 28.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 55.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 56.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., Summarized from pp. 14-16, 28.

⁷³ *Blair Warning Over Euro Force*. Accessed at www.bbc.co.uk on 1 February 2002, p. 1.

⁷⁴ *Euro-Army Must Be Free of NATO, Says France’s Top Soldier*. Accessed at www.ananova.com on 04 April 2002.

coordination with it.⁷⁵ This is in diametric opposition to Tony Blair. Mr. Blair has consistently rebutted this statement by assuring that the EURRF “would only act in situations where NATO indicated it did not want to get involved, and that ...it would have ‘no separate military planning structures.’”⁷⁶

Furthermore, St. Malo seemingly took ESDI out of the fold of NATO and transformed it into the decidedly European CFSP, to the alarm of NATO and some of its members.⁷⁷ CFSP, therefore, is the cause for much debate not only between the UK and France, but for the EU as a whole, and NATO and its allies. On the one side is the UK, which believes in the maintenance of NATO and the building of a European force within it, and on the other is France, which believes in “meaningful European autonomy in the fullest sense of the word.”⁷⁸ However, “French officials stress that the object of the exercise is not the diminishing of US influence, but the *re-balancing* of [NATO] in order to increase its overall strength.”⁷⁹

This French position seems opposed to, and in the view of the UK, “unattainable.”⁸⁰ “French doctrine has never fully spelled out what French vital interests are.”⁸¹ They change from President to President.⁸² This is evidenced by Charles de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the NATO Alliance in 1966, to France’s partial reconciliation with NATO in 1995, to the current regime’s position of

⁷⁵ Europe’s rapid reaction Force: What, Why, and How? Accessed at www.nyu.edu on 04 April 2002, p. 1.

⁷⁶ *Euro-Army Must Be Free of NATO, Says France’s Top Soldier*, p. 1.

⁷⁷ Howorth, p. 15.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Gregory, p. 145.

⁸² *Ibid.*

France recognizing "that the North Atlantic Alliance is the essential link between Europeans and Americans."⁸³ However, this is tenuous at best. France is unique in its relationship with NATO. France sits on NATO's Military Committee, but not on its Nuclear Planning Group, nor are French forces under NATO control during peacetime, just wartime.⁸⁴ This, however, is a dichotomy, as the Eurocorps and the EUROFOR, in both of which France is a member, are listed under NATO's "Command Authority" as answerable to the WEU, but under NATO control when deployed.⁸⁵ Additionally, France "regularly" participates in NATO's North Atlantic Council, but is not a full member, and participates fully in "NATO's Situation Center, and the NATO Defense College and [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] SHAPE School"...as part of the Military Committee.⁸⁶

The reason France is not a full member of NATO is, in part, because of two factors. First, France demanded control of Atlantic Command South, or AFSOUTH, a NATO regional command. NATO rejected this notion out of fear that the "French rapprochement with NATO was a 'Trojan Horse'- France coming to the Alliance to change it from within," and because European command of AFSOUTH "would neatly align NATO's security concerns with France's own national security interests in the Mediterranean" it seems, in particular

⁸³ Compiled from: Cohen, Rodger, *France Will Return To NATO's Military Fold After 30-Year Absence*. Accessed at www.chron.com on 26 March 2002, p. 1., and *The National Defense*. Accessed at www.defense.gouv.fr accessed on 04 April 2002, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Cohen, p. 1.

⁸⁵ Young, p. 7.

⁸⁶ Gregory, p. 110. The NATO North Atlantic Council, NAC, is the "principal decision making authority of [NATO]," and "is the most important decision-making body in NATO." (From, NATO Handbook, pp. 42, 35.)

EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.⁸⁷ Second, because of its rejection of command of AFSOUTH, political and public opinion in France, instilled the notion that NATO was still largely US led, and there was no indication of movement within NATO towards a balanced US-European relationship.⁸⁸

Despite all of France's rhetoric of creating a decidedly European CFSP, France's defense spending has been on the decline. The following year 2002 chart, from the French Ministry of Defense, shows this decline clearly:⁸⁹

BUDGET EVOLUTION SINCE 1998
(excluding pensions)

YEAR	PAYMENT CREDITS (BND)	% GDP **
1998	28161	2.16%
1999	28959	2.14%
2000	28652	2.04%
2001	28804	1.97%
2002 ⁹⁰	29323	1.93%*

* Estimates

** Gross domestic product (GDP) corresponds to the sum of all gross value added (including VAT) for goods

* For Sections V and VI, available payment credits comprise € 12.3 billion budget credits and € 0.4 billion authorisations for utilisation of 2001 credits brought forward

The same is true of the UK's defense budget. Despite the UK's commitment to the NATO Alliance and the EU defense initiative, the UK's budget from 1998/1999 to 2001/2002 declined from 22.24 billion pounds sterling to 21.35 billion pounds sterling.⁹⁰ Furthermore, the UK only had a 1998 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$1.25 trillion, which was two-thirds the GDP of Germany and one-seventh the GDP of the US.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 109, 113.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 113.

⁸⁹ Chart from *Defense Facts And Figures: 2002 Budget*. French Ministry of Defense, accessed at www.defense.gouv.fr on 04 May 2002, p. 3.

⁹⁰ Unterseher, Lutz. *Europe's Armed Forces At The Millennium: A case Study of Change In France, The United Kingdom, and Germany*, Nov. 1999. Accessed at www.comw.org on 4 May 2002, p. 16.

⁹¹ Ibid.

However, despite, or because of, low and declining defense budgets, both countries have undertaken reform in their terrestrial forces. The present French Army structure is as follows:

- 1 Corps with:
 - 2 armored divisions and 1 mountain division together comprising:
 - 5 armored battalions,
 - 4 mechanized infantry battalions on tracked MICVs,
 - 4 motorized infantry battalions, and
 - 3 mountain infantry battalions;
 - 1 armored "division"/Eurocorps comprising 2 armored and 1 mechanized infantry battalions.
- Rapid Action Force with:
 - 1 airborne division (6 parachute battalions, 1 light armored cavalry battalion),
 - 1 light armored marine division (2 infantry battalions on wheeled APCs and 1 light armored battalion),
 - 1 light armored division (2 armored cavalry, 2 infantry battalions on wheeled APCs), and
 - 1 airmobile division (1 infantry, 3 combat helicopters, 1 support helicopter battalion).
- Element of the Franco-German brigade: 1 light armored and 1 motorized infantry battalions. And,
- Territorial defense forces: 7 infantry battalions.⁹²

Proposed changes would abolish the corps and division level, and reorganize the army into 9 brigades, which could then be organized into 4 major combat groups.

These brigades would assume an intervention aspect along the following force structure:

- 2 armored brigades (each with 2 armored and 2 mechanized infantry battalions),
- 2 mechanized brigades (each with 1 armored and 2 mechanized infantry battalions),
- 2 light armored brigades (each with 2 light armored and 2 light mechanized infantry battalions),
- 2 infantry brigades (each with 1 light armored and 3 motorized infantry battalions), and

⁹² Ibid., p. 9.

- 1 air-mechanized brigade (with 3 combat/utility helicopter battalions and 1 reconnaissance helicopter battalion).⁹³

Despite these changes, however, it is unclear how France would meet its internal and external obligations, when 2 of these 9 brigades are already committed to the Eurocorps (reference Table 1), and part of another brigade, at least 1 light armored battalion and 1 motorized infantry battalion, is dedicated to the Franco-German Brigade (previously referenced). Furthermore, an additional brigade is tacitly committed to EUFOR, leaving approximately 5.5 brigades in the inventory to rotate and train. Additionally, a French brigade totals approximately 5,000 soldiers, adding confusion to Table 1 (in the bold number 12,000, in the left-hand column under France).⁹⁴ Two brigades equals roughly 10,000 personnel, with a possible 2,000 more in support, which equals 12,000. However, whether this is in addition to, or comprised of, the already two committed brigades is unclear.

Like France, the UK is revamping its armed forces as well. Presently, the UK Army consists of 10 brigades with 2-3,000 soldiers comprising a brigade.⁹⁵ Below is a comparison of the present structure versus proposed changes:

Present structure:

- 1 armored division: with 3 armored brigades (allocated to the ARRC);
- 1 mechanized division: with 2 mechanized brigades (1 heavy with tracked carriers, 1 light with wheeled carriers) and 1 airborne brigade (strategic reserve); and
- 3 independent infantry brigades (relatively small, motorized), partly deployed to Northern Ireland.

⁹³ Ibid., Summarized from pp. 9-10.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

Major changes:

- 1 mechanized brigade is to be created (by reassigning, restructuring, and strengthening elements of the existing airborne brigade, which will be dissolved).
- 1 new type of (air maneuver) brigade is to be developed.
- 2 of the 8 existing armored regiments (battalion-sized) are to be reassigned to armored [reconnaissance] reconnaissance and NBC tasks, respectively. And,
- The 6 remaining tank regiments are to be enlarged to become 58-tank units (formerly they had 38), however, only 30 tanks per unit will be kept in the front line day-to-day.⁹⁶

The new UK force structure is also designed to “emphasize mechanization and mobility.”⁹⁷ However, unlike the French, the UK is adding a brigade and possibly, more, depending on how the above mentioned tank regiments/units are restructured. Therefore, if the new force structure is 11 brigades and they comprise 2-3,000 personnel, according to Table 1, 3-4 of these brigades have been committed to the new EURRF. Furthermore, 5-6 brigades have been committed to NATO.⁹⁸ Using the lower numbers of committed brigades, 3 and 5, this leaves 3 out of 11(+) brigades uncommitted.

-Germany:

“The former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl believes that an American withdrawal or a collapse of NATO without the precondition of a federal Europe would inevitably thrust Germany, as Europe’s most economically successful, populous, and central power, into” the role of Europe’s hegemon.⁹⁹ Due to historical implications, this is not a position that either “Kohl’s successors,” or other Europeans want, for good reason. Furthermore, even though Germany

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Young, p. 7. (Chart, showing two UK Divisions under NATO Command Authority in wartime, with coordinating authority in peacetime.)

⁹⁹ Eden, p. 41.

has revamped its constitution to deploy military forces outside its borders (a prohibition against deployment was established as a result of World War II), it requires an "explicit parliamentary approval, expressed by simple majority, ...for an armed German military mission" to take part in an action that is not part of NATO or not in self-defense.¹⁰⁰ Expressly, "it is desirable that a consensus be reached across the political spectrum before German troops participate in any [military missions]."¹⁰¹ Therefore, it will be a long time before Germany takes "a security role that befits its economic status" and military status.¹⁰²

Militarily, Germany "fields NATO's largest European land force," and has the seventh largest defense budget in the world, as defense spending is presently declining.¹⁰³ Germany's Army is divided into main defense forces and crisis reaction forces that total "20 mechanized brigades with main battle tanks."¹⁰⁴ The breakdown is as follows:

The crisis reaction forces, which are fully active, consist of the following:

- 2 mechanized brigades,
- 1 airmobile brigade,
- 1 light mechanized (Jäger) brigade,
- 1 air mechanized brigade (in the process of formation),
- ½ brigade light mechanized (the German component of the Franco-German brigade) and,
- 1 Special Forces command (size: ½ brigade).

The *main defense forces* consist of the following:

- 4 brigades to replace crisis reaction elements (largely active), comprising

¹⁰⁰ Duke, p. 287.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Howorth, p. 27.

¹⁰⁴ Unterseher, p. 29.

- 2 mechanized brigades,
- 1 mountain brigade (light infantry, partly mechanized),
- 1 airmobile brigade;
- 8 mechanized brigades (partly skeletonized); and
- 4 mechanized brigades (with extra staffing and equipment to double on mobilization).¹⁰⁵

Thus with 20 brigades, Germany's forces are twice that of the UK and France, individually. Furthermore, Germany has only committed forces to NATO and the EURRF. Within NATO, Germany has committed at least 16.5 brigades as best can be discerned. These are to Multinational Corps Northeast/Corps LandJUTT (3), V US/German Corps (3), II German/US Corps (3), ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (1), I German/Netherlands Corps (3), the Franco-German Brigade (.5), and Eurocorps (2), Multinational Division Central Europe (1).¹⁰⁶ Outside these arrangements, it is unclear whether the number promised in bold under Germany, 13,500 (Table 1), is the commitment to Eurocorps or an additional commitment to the EURRF. A German division consists of two to three brigades.¹⁰⁷ A brigade consists of approximately 2,500 to 4,500 soldiers.¹⁰⁸ Utilizing 4,500, plus a support brigade of 4,500, equals 13,500- the number promised to Eurocorps. However, this is unclear.¹⁰⁹ If this is another division, then 19.5 of the 20 German Brigades are committed to pre-existing arrangements as opposed to 16.5.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Information compiled from Young, p. 7, and the Bundeswehr Website, articles *German-Netherlands Corps*, *II German American Corps*, *V German American Corps*, *Multinational Corps Northeast*, *Allied Command Europe Mobile Force*, *Multi National Division Central Europe*, and *French-German Brigade*, accessed at www.bundeswehr.de on 8 April 2002.

¹⁰⁷ *The Army*. Accessed at www.bundeswehr.de on 4 April 2002, p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

-Belgium:

Belgium, in the past, has had two Secretaries General of NATO.¹¹⁰ This is only befitting as NATO headquarters is in Brussels, Belgium. Being a small country, Belgium does not have a substantial Army. The Belgian Army, minus support and reconnaissance, is composed of four brigades, the Airmobile Brigade, and three mechanized brigades, the 1st, 17th, and the 7th. According to their proposed force structure for the year 2015, the 17th Brigade will drop, leaving only 3 brigades. According to Table 1, all three of the current brigades are committed to Eurocorps. Further, it is unclear whether the 1,000 under Belgium, in the left-hand column of Table 1, is dedicated to already committed forces, or it represents the Airmobile Brigade, which is roughly the equal to three battalions or approximately 1,000-2,000 men.¹¹¹

-Spain:

Spain, like France, has no forces committed to NATO in peacetime and, like Belgium, has a relatively small Army. According to Spain's Ministry of Defense, the Army is composed of 8 brigades, three of which are in the 1st Mechanized Division. According to Table 1, these forces are committed to Eurocorps. In accordance with EUROFOR, one brigade is supposed to be committed. This leaves 4 unaligned brigades. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the 8,000, in bold under Spain in the left-hand column of Table 1, are dedicated to already committed forces, or represent the Spanish Rapid Reaction Force,

¹¹⁰ NATO Handbook, p. 365.

¹¹¹ Compiled from Official Belgian Military Website, article *The Land Component*. Accessed at www.mil.be on 8 April 2002, pp. 5, 10, 11, 20.

which is approximately 10,000 men, or other unit(s), because the division listed under the Eurocorps column in Table 1 consists of 18,000 men.¹¹²

-Summary:

As the information about the force structures of the countries listed above was compiled from various sources and public information websites, some error is attributed. Additionally, no reserve forces were taken into account, or naval, marine, or air forces. However, the force structures versus dedicated commitments clearly demonstrate on paper at least, an over-stretch of commitments with over half of the forces listed committed to pre-existing agreements. This, of course, does not take into account the high probability of only one or two security arrangements being activated at a time. Instead, it is based on a low-probability, worst-case scenario, with all the listed security arrangements being activated simultaneously, or with extensive overlap. This being the case, it still paints a very convoluted picture as troops deployed must be rotated, and troops at home must train or conduct other internal missions. Furthermore, it demonstrates the danger of the EURRF/Eurocorps being deployed completely independent of NATO, as most of the forces allocated to the EURRF/Eurocorps are also slated for NATO deployment.

¹¹² Compiled from *Principales Unidades De La Fuerza Terrestre*. Accessed at www.mde.es on 04 May 2002.

II. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) And Its Relation to ESDI

A. NATO Initiatives

NATO began in 1949, when the US, Canada, and 10 European Nations signed the Washington Treaty.¹¹³ This treaty stipulates NATO's "essential and enduring purpose... to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means."¹¹⁴ Since that time, NATO has expanded to include 19 different member states, 17 of which are European.¹¹⁵

The most important organizations within NATO are the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NAC is the premier decision-making body and is comprised of permanent representatives from each of the 19 member countries. Its decisions are consensus-based and it selects the Secretary General, who presides over the council, as well as the international staff of military and civilian experts. The DPC assembles a minimum of twice per year at the member state Minister of Defense level. All member countries, excluding France, are represented at meetings by either the permanent representative or Defense Minister, in order to deal with "collective defense issues." The Defense Ministers also meet in the NPG to discuss issues involving Alliance nuclear forces.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A Strategy for The 21st Century*. (Department of Defense) December 2000, p.10

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., Entire paragraph summarized from p. 10.

Like all organizations, NATO has evolved over the years. Currently, it is in the midst of expansion, and has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the mid-1990's Yugoslav crises, in turmoil with EU security initiatives that appear to evolve outside its fold. As indicated in the previous sections, and by Figure 7.2, this is a very real concern. The chart below clarifies this some, as it demonstrates more clearly the member countries of NATO and the EU as well as forces allocated and the specified command/political relationships.¹¹⁷




Table 1. Command Authorities of NATO and European Bi-/Multinational Formations.

Table 2. Definition of NATO Command Authorities.

¹¹⁷ Chart, "A Comparison of NATO EU Full Memberships" from Brassey's, p. 29. Table 1 and Table 2, from Young, pp. 7 and 9, respectively.

Some NATO initiatives to emerge after the Cold War were EAPC, as previously discussed, the Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and the Allied Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC). The PFP “was established in 1994 to enhance [NATO] contacts and cooperation with the newly democratizing states of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia.”¹¹⁸ It includes “26 non-NATO participating states.”¹¹⁹ Unfortunately, it is seen by many of these states, especially the former Soviet Republics, as not only a stepping-stone to NATO and the US, but, once accepted to NATO, a further step towards EU accession.¹²⁰ Since the criteria for NATO membership is less “stringent and multifaceted than those for [the EU]...[NATO] has moved ahead of the EU in accepting new members.”¹²¹ This creates further concern for the EU and those states that fear NATO dominance in European security, namely France.

The CJTF concept was developed in 1994 as an enhancement to ESDI.¹²² It was agreed that the CJTF concept would be “the means by which NATO could not only undertake its own Article 5 or non-Article 5 missions more flexibly, but support operations by the [WEU].”¹²³ (Article 5 missions refer to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which stipulates if any member state is directly attacked, the other member states are compelled to respond in defense of that state. Conversely, non-Article 5 missions are missions such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, etc.) The CJTF concept, as proposed to the US, was also

¹¹⁸ Brassey's, p. 48.

¹¹⁹ *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A Strategy for The 21st Century*, p. 27.

¹²⁰ Brassey's, pp. 48-49.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

¹²² Borawski, p. 31.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

"to encourage European nations to undertake missions with forces that [were] separable, but not separate from NATO in the context of an emerging ESDI."¹²⁴ In 1996-1998, three CJTF headquarters were created, however, as of 2000, the concept has yet to be fully implemented.¹²⁵ Part of this problem is "the legal and political constraints nations [such as Germany and the US] may face in providing collective assets to a non-NATO led operation."¹²⁶

ARRC was the fall-out of NATO's 1991 Strategy Review Group (SRG) involving all NATO members and France. However, France joined the SRG only when it became clear that policies affecting Europe were being made in its absence. The SRG concluded that NATO needed a rapid capability to respond to crises in areas outside its traditional territorial bounds (member states) or an "out-of-area" capability. Most member countries agreed, but France opposed this, maintaining that NATO should be maintained in reserve as a counter to any re-emergent Soviet/Russian threat. As a compromise, the ARRC was instituted as an Article 5 rapid response mechanism.¹²⁷ Currently, the ARRC, with its headquarters in Mönchengladbach, Germany, is a British-dominated reaction force headquarters with 11 multinational divisions declared to it.¹²⁸ However, it only has the capacity to handle four.¹²⁹

B. Linkage Between NATO, CFSP, ESDI, And EURRF

Currently, NATO is in the process of enlargement. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have recently become members of NATO through the

¹²⁴ Brassey's, pp. 38-39.

¹²⁵ Borawski, p. 32.


¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., Summarized from pages 61-62.

¹²⁸ Young, p. 15.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), with other Eastern European countries likely to follow soon. Therefore, with the EU expanding its defense capabilities at the same time as NATO, where is the linkage between the two, how is redundancy avoided, and cooperation achieved? The chart below depicts NATO and EU members and the intersection between the two.¹³⁰



In April 1999, NATO launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the purpose of which was “to identify existing overall NATO capacity, to detect needs and gaps (mainly on the European side) and arrange for these gaps to be filled.”¹³¹ The study “examined 58 areas of military capacity with a focus on US-European and intra-European interoperability.... The teams working on DCI sought to coordinate this work with the intra-EU work on the [EURRF].”¹³² Furthermore, in July 2000, a “EU-NATO Ad hoc working group on collective capabilities...was intended to coordinate the work of the DCI with that of [a European Interim Military Body-EURRF Task Force].”¹³³ However, its findings

¹³⁰ Chart from Brassey's, Inc., *European Security Institutions: Ready for The Twenty-First Century?* p. 29.

¹³¹ Howorth, Jolyon, *Chaillot Paper 43-European Integration And Defense: The Ultimate Challenge*. (Alencon, France: Institute For Security Studies of Western European Union) 2000, p. 21.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

were unclear, but it gave "a focus for the necessary discussions between NATO and the EU on a range of issues."¹³⁴

Several NATO publications address ESDI. Chapter 4 of the *NATO Handbook* addresses ESDI and has undergone several revisions. First, in October 2001, it stated that, "the Alliance is committed to reinforcing its European pillar through the development of an effective...[ESDI] which could respond to European requirements and at the same time contribute to Alliance security."¹³⁵ Second, in February 2002, it states, "as a result to develop ESDI within NATO, arrangements were made to ensure that the further adaptation of the Alliance covered all aspects of NATO support for a WEU-led operation."¹³⁶ (The WEU is mentioned because it is the acting interim body for the EU until all organizations are in place.¹³⁷) Finally, in accordance with the latest *Understanding NATO* publication, dated 21 March 2001:

The purpose of strengthening the European side of the Alliance through ESDI is to enable the European Allies to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defense field. Drawing on NATO's assets and capabilities, the European Allies would be able to conduct operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily. Such operations might be conducted, for example, under the leadership of the European Union. Arrangements are currently being worked out between NATO and the European Union to make this possible. Strengthening the role played by the European countries will also result in a fairer distribution of the burdens and responsibilities of security between the two sides of the Atlantic, creating a more evenly balanced

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ NATO Handbook-Chapter 4: *The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)*. Revised 02 October 2001. Accessed at www.nato.int on 01 May 2002, p.1.

¹³⁶ NATO Handbook-Chapter 4: *The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)*. Revised 02 February 2002. Accessed at www.nato.int on 01 May 2002, p.1.

¹³⁷ *Assembly of WEU: The Interim European Security and Defense Assembly*. Accessed at www.assemblee-ueo.org on 1 April 2002, p. 1.

transatlantic relationship adapted to the needs of the 21st century.¹³⁸

It is clear that the linkage between NATO and the EU over ESDI is one of evolving interdependence. Where this interdependence leads cannot be determined at this time. However, it is clear that NATO, despite ESDI, will continue to exist and enhance ESDI as long as the Europeans are committed to it and do not degrade from the capabilities of the Alliance. This is in accordance with the findings in *NATO and The Future of European Security*, by Sean Kay, who concludes "NATO is still needed because Europe has yet to evolve into a situation of guaranteed peace," and "that day is far beyond the horizon"...but "NATO shall survive"...with European security being "one of the most important issues of the twenty-first century."¹³⁹

¹³⁸ *Understanding NATO*. Accessed at www.nato.int on 01 May 2002.

¹³⁹ Kay, p. 156.

III. ESDI Enhancers and Detractors From European Integration And Cooperation

A. Some Educated Perspectives: Practitioners And Scholars

In May 2001, US General Ralston, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, issued a press release in which he stated, "I support the current efforts on behalf of the European Union to create a [EURRF] capability; if Europe is more capable, it will be a better place for North America."¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, he praised the CJTF concept, and the fact that his deputy was a European Officer who could "assume the role of strategic coordinator/commander...[and that] this [was] vital since [there was] only one set of forces from which to draw capabilities, and they must be properly de-conflicted."¹⁴¹ These statements were made in accordance with US policy on ESDI since the Clinton administration, which supported ESDI, but espoused the "three D's, no decoupling [from NATO], no duplication [of NATO capabilities], no discrimination," (i.e., exclusion of a particular country for various reasons) in reference to EU security policy.¹⁴²

Furthermore, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (UK), in reference to ESDI, insists on "what he terms the three 'I's': (1) improvements in European defense spending; (2) inclusiveness of the non-EU NATO allies in common efforts (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the [US]; (3) indivisibility of the

¹⁴⁰ *SACEUR Address Center For International Studies' Conference In Barcelona*. (Dated 11 May 2001) Accessed at www.shape.nato.int on 04 April 2002.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² Borawski, p. 38.

transatlantic link.”¹⁴³ He shows support not only for NATO and the US, but the UK’s Prime Minister Tony Blair’s position, as well. Finally, as previously discussed, he supports the views of Germany’s former Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his successors.

The above stated opinions are from practitioners, and in one camp, NATO. Therefore, scholars must be included as well. According to McKenzie and Loedel, in *The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation*, realists believe that “the events from 1990 onwards have not ushered in a new era of international politics.”¹⁴⁴ Instead “institutions remain primarily disproportionate determined by the institutions’ dominant powers.”¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, “institutions serve as forums for competition between national priorities” and “security interdependence does not exist.”¹⁴⁶ Conversely, neo-liberals believe that the new “era would be marked by growing multi-lateral cooperation and the increasing employment of international institutions facilitate,” among other things, “an era of European security cooperation...characterized by shared [trans-Atlantic] interests.”¹⁴⁷ McKenzie and Loedel disagree with both and think there is a middle ground. They conclude, “Too much is at stake for Europe and the transatlantic relationship” not to allow compromise on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁴⁸ This is because the preponderance of the evidence

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ McKenzie, Mary M., and Peter H. Loedel, eds., *The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests, and Institutions*. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers) 1998, p. 176.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 178-184.

demonstrates that ESDI and NATO must be bound together, despite power politics, sovereignty issues, and national prestige, to name but a few.¹⁴⁹

McKenzie and Loedel's findings are reiterated by other scholars as well, namely one of the US's chief intellectuals, Charles Kupchan. Kupchan argues that the critical fault of the US "is 'in failing to recognize that the traditional Atlantic bargain is already unraveling, that status quo, is unattainable, and that the Atlantic link can be preserved only if the [US] and Europe strike...a more equitable bargain.'"¹⁵⁰ Therefore, he calls for a more "proactive policy of support for EU empowerment and for new thinking on a more mature and balanced strategic partnership between the EU and the United States."¹⁵¹

B. Has ESDI, The EURRF, And NATO Expansion Contributed To European And International Cooperation?

The answer to this question is a resounding yes, in several areas. First, in the European political arena, the history of the Eurocorps speaks for itself. The signing of the Elysee Treaty was a major breakthrough in Franco-German relations, as well as the formation of the Franco-German Brigade 25 years later. Additionally, the fact that all the treaties involved, achieving the level of commitment to participation in the Eurocorps/EURRF beyond the original five members, is indicative of political commitment to strengthening the ideals of the EU as an institution.

Next, is in the area of enhanced defense industrial cooperation. With the advent of CFSP and ESDI, the defense industry in Europe has begun to

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Howorth, p. 35.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

increasingly cooperate.¹⁵² According to the *European Defense Industrial*

Consolidation: Implications for US Industry and Policy:

Since the mid-1990's France has...begun to move away from what had been, for fifty years, a very solid and nearly intractable position with respect to national defense. Such a move was manifested in a number of different ways, including the abandonment of a strict policy of state ownership of defense companies. Thales [a major French arms-manufacturer]...is now less than 30 percent state owned and is expected to reduce that ownership even more over time.¹⁵³

Furthermore, "over the last couple of years...progress has been achieved in the field of [European] aerospace and defense electronics, including the reshaping of...Thales...and the formation of the European Aeronautic and Space Company (EADS)."¹⁵⁴ More evidence of the above is the Euro-Fighter project.

The Euro-Fighter project "was originally started by British Aerospace in the early 80's."¹⁵⁵ It was originally designed to be "a single-seat air defense/superiority fighter," but evolved into a dual role defense/superiority and ground attack fighter."¹⁵⁶ In 1983, "Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, and France began to collaborate" on the Euro-Fighter.¹⁵⁷ The aircraft was supposed to enter service in the mid-1990's, but production delays and conflict among the member countries forced France to abandon the project in 1985.¹⁵⁸ The remaining countries then formed Euro-Fighter GmbH, which is owned 33% by British Aerospace, 33% by DASA of Germany, 21% by Alenia of Italy, and 13% by

¹⁵² *A European Army?*, p. 3.

¹⁵³ *European Defense Industrial Consolidation: Implications for U.S. Industry and Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: Center For Strategic & International Studies- Europe Program) 2001, p. 2.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁵⁵ *Specification: Eurofighter 2000.* Accessed at www.home.achilles.net, on 25 April 2002, p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

CASA of Spain.¹⁵⁹ "Current orders stand at approximately 600 aircraft- UK 250, Italy 130, Germany 130, and Spain 87."¹⁶⁰

Cooperation has also been increased on the extra-European international political level. In this arena, NATO's enlargement, seemingly tacit support of ESDI, and cooperation with the WEU/EU has wooed France over the last several years. First, in December 1995, "France announced...that it would resume active participation in NATO's military wing almost three decades after Charles de Gaulle pulled the country out of the Alliance's military command and ordered US forces out of France."¹⁶¹ The impetus for this was the European debacle over the former Yugoslavia, subsequent US involvement at the behest of Britain and Germany, who both saw that the US had a vital and "unique military and political credibility in Europe."¹⁶² France's decision to rejoin NATO had two immediate outcomes. First, France was allowed to begin sending its Defense Minister to NATO meetings and then permitted "to rejoin the Alliance's military committee."¹⁶³ Second, "France in effect acknowledged that NATO [would] continue to stand at the heart of Europe's defenses...and that any European military force [would] evolve within [NATO] rather than outside it."¹⁶⁴ (Note: It was decided that French forces would not be placed under NATO command in

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Cohen, Roger, *France Will Return To NATO's Military Fold After 30-Year Absence*. (New York Times) Accessed at www.chron.com on 26 April 2002, p. 1.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

peacetime, nor would France participate in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, a "position close to that of Spain."¹⁶⁵)

Additionally, in July 2001, the French Minister of Defense, Alain Ricard, in a speech, stated that France was entering "a new period" consisting of "three evolutions"- assessing threats, updating weapon systems, and competing for resources.¹⁶⁶ To solve these problems, he stated that France would look not only among Europeans, but also on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, he stated that France/Europe "must maintain Allied interoperability and complementarities," and that convergence must be built into decisions by sharing technologies across the Atlantic, before the procurement of new weapon systems.¹⁶⁸ Finally, he concluded with three cogent points that indicate a loosening of French rhetoric:

[1] Preparing for the security challenges of the coming decades will require intellectual and political determination. We should help each other in analyzing all the aspects of these challenges in order to convince and mobilize our democratic societies, which will tend naturally to avoid multiple commitments in remote conflicts.

[2] European and American approaches and interests should always coincide or be complementary, provided both sides of the Atlantic work on it. Each side should take into account the views of the other one in their own domestic work. This is far more demanding than it sounds and now is the time to do it because we are in a period of innovation and change.

[3] Finally, there is every reason why the Europeans can and should succeed in developing a European reaction capability, which will be entirely compatible with the efforts to renew and

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Richard, Alain, *Security In The XXI Century-A European Perspective*. Accessed at www.csis.org on 20 April 2002.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

strengthen the Alliance. On both sides of the Atlantic, we will have to accept that our answers and priorities may sometimes differ. Nevertheless, the determination of the Europeans to maintain an effective transatlantic partnership is real. I certainly will do all I can to ensure that. Our intention is still and will remain to strengthen the Alliance, which remains the cornerstone of security in Europe.¹⁶⁹

In the field of transatlantic defense industry cooperation, improvements are being made as well. In 1998, BAE Systems (a British owned defense multinational corporation) "bought US defense contractor Tractor," amid a flurry of "national security considerations."¹⁷⁰ However, due to a changed environment, these considerations were quickly resolved and BAE is now the Pentagon's 5th or 6th largest supplier "with annual revenues of \$3.5 billion and 22,000 employees [in] 22 states."¹⁷¹ Furthermore, BAE has participated in the development of several new US weapons systems to include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the US Army and Marine Corps lightweight howitzer, and the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM).¹⁷² Thus BAE, NATO enlargement, EDSI, and other factors, in part, opened the doors to the "2000 Defense Trade and Security Initiative (DSTI)," which was aimed at facilitating international industrial cooperation.¹⁷³ Additionally, at least two "France-US Defense Industry Business Forums" have been conducted to date.¹⁷⁴

In sum, industry on both sides of the Atlantic has good reason to cooperate with each other. Their interests in cooperation need not be identical to lead mutually beneficial actions, as long as they become convergent at an appropriate point in the future. [As demonstrated], such convergence is already taking place [both in

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁷⁰ *European Defense Industrial Consolidation: Implications for U.S. Industry and Policy*, p. 4.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 3-5.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

Europe and transatlantic]...as a result of changes in the international security environment.¹⁷⁵

C. Has ESDI, The EURRF, and NATO Expansion Detracted From European and International Cooperation?

Once again, the answer is a resounding yes. On the European side politically, ESDI has fostered resentment. First, "six NATO members (Norway, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and Iceland) are being shut out of the planning and decision-making processes, as observers that can be bypassed."¹⁷⁶ This has caused such friction that the "Turkish Government has...refused to agree that the EU should have guaranteed access to NATO military planners when conducting operations."¹⁷⁷ Second, this obstinate Turkish position is further confounded by the EU desire to consider Greek-Cypriot's for EU administration, while in deadlock over Turkey's accession to the EU.¹⁷⁸ Finally, a major potential time bomb is the fact that no member state of the Eurocorps proper, nor those which have signed on beyond the core five states, has any obligation to participate in a EURRF deployment, if it deems its national interests supercede the deployment. Thus, forces for a deployment, and the Eurocorps MNCS, theoretically may not be available, squelching the deployment.

In the area of European defense industry cooperation, several problems overshadow sweeping integration. Among these are failures to learn from mistakes, such as, state ownership of industries, size and market percentage,


¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ *The US-European Strategic Relationship: Can It Endure?* Accessed at www.aei.org on 25 April 2002, p. 6.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

¹⁷⁸ FIBIS Transcribed Text. *AA Summarizes Progress In Turkish-EU Relations in 2001.* Accessed at wnc.fedworld.gov on 21 March 2002, p. 3.

and varying horizontal or vertical competence structures.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, “the harmonization process may be influenced by the fact that each of the organizations that have an interest in these [issues] has variations among its member structures.”¹⁸⁰ These include, the WEU, the EU, NATO, “the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), and...the Joint Armaments Cooperation Organization (JACO- a Franco-German initiative for armaments cooperation and procurement),” which all have competing interests.¹⁸¹ (The graph below depicts “the membership cadres for [the above listed]...organizations,” as well as, “the difference between the core...and...peripheral countries.”¹⁸²)



* indicates associated member to the WEU

□ indicates status of observation to the WEU

¹⁷⁹ De Nooy, Gert, ed., *The Role of European Ground and Air forces After The Cold War*. (Den Hauge, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International) 1997, pp. 100-101.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 15. Note: Graph is also from p. 15. CNAD stands for Conference of National Armaments Directors. (From *European Defense Industrial Consolidation: Implications for U.S. Industry and Policy*, p. ii.)

Finally, the Euro Fighter debate is a classic example of one member state withdrawing from a program due to untimely and contentious infighting.

In the area of transatlantic defense industry cooperation, the situation appears quite dismal at present. On both sides of the Atlantic, barriers to further cooperation, such as the following, must be thoughtfully and carefully mitigated: "market access and reciprocity, exchange of technologies, patent intellectual rights, export controls, and [the standardization] of classified information procedures."¹⁸³ If they are not, trade imbalances and national protectionism of industry might increase, in the form of increased tariffs, embargos, etc... In the end, "the role of governments [both national and supranational] play in reducing trans-Atlantic barriers cannot be overstated."¹⁸⁴ Decision-making elites, at all levels of government, must face and assess threats and "the new geopolitical realities of the 21st Century...and...determine what is needed on the industry-side to address those issues most effectively."¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ *European Defense Industrial Consolidation: Implications for U.S. Industry and Policy*, p. 8.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

IV. Case Studies In Force Compatibility, Language, Procurement, and Regional Stability and NATO/EU Integration Problems

This chapter utilizes three case studies- Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic- countries that are new NATO members and forerunning EU aspirants, to augment the preceding chapters. Additionally, these countries illuminate other issue areas such as language incompatibility, interoperability issues, budgetary constraints, and regional/ethnic problems that are not solely indicative of these countries, but also are indicative of other NATO and EU aspirants, as well as some of the Western European countries aforementioned in Chapter I.

-Hungary:

In March 1999, Hungary became a member of NATO, along with Poland and the Czech Republic.¹⁸⁶ With its accession into NATO, Hungary brought 43,790 active military personnel to the NATO Alliance, along with 90,300 reserves, and 14,000 paramilitary forces.¹⁸⁷ These forces are divided into three categories: Ground Forces, Air Forces, and the Border Guard.¹⁸⁸ The only Division in the Hungarian Ground Forces is the 3rd Mechanized Division. Although not much more information is available about the organization and missions of these forces, the Hungarian constitution states "all citizens of the Republic of Hungary have the duty to defend the homeland," clearly indicating

¹⁸⁶ Teleki, Iona, *Eastern Europe's Decade of Stability?* (Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2001) Accessed at www.csis.org on 3 June 2002, p. 2.

¹⁸⁷ *Hungary: Republic of Hungary*. Accessed at www.child-soldiers.org on 3 June 2002, p. 1.

¹⁸⁸ *Hungary Military 2000*. Accessed at www.photius.com on 04 June 2002, p. 1.

that these forces are most likely dedicated to the defense of Hungary proper.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, several issues cloud Hungary's accession to NATO.

First, prior to 1999, there was a large debate over Hungary's geographical location. Hungary, as a NATO member, is "an island, difficult to defend and reach in a crisis...it [borders] no other NATO member country."¹⁹⁰ It has no sea access, which is exacerbated by the fact of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, which makes Austria a neutral country.¹⁹¹ In the event of a crisis, Austria's territory cannot be traversed.¹⁹² Therefore, other than the accession of Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, or Austria, itself, into NATO, there is no assured access to Hungary in the event of crises.¹⁹³

Second, Hungary has "difficulties on three borders:" with the former Czechoslovakia, the former Yugoslavia, and Romania.¹⁹⁴ "Although there are...no claims to change any borders, Hungary is still concerned about ethnic Magyars [ethnic Hungarians] in Slovakia, Transylvania [Romania], and Voivodina (the part of Serbia north of Belgrade)."¹⁹⁵ The situation of the 3 million Magyars living in these areas, especially Hungarian language rights in Slovakia, is followed closely in the Hungarian media, and plays a factor in Hungarian domestic politics.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, the Magyar population in the Vojvodina

¹⁸⁹ Hungary: *Republic of Hungary*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁰ Roskin, Michael G., *NATO: The Strange Alliance Getting Stranger*. From "Parameters," Summer 1998, pp. 30-38. Accessed at www.carlisle.army.mil 3 June 2002, p. 5.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Roskin, Michael G., *The Rebirth of East Europe*. 4th Ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall) 2002, p. 154.

province “complicated Hungary’s role in NATO’s war against Serbia’s [President] Milosevic.”¹⁹⁷

Thirdly, a problem exists with Hungary’s armed forces. “The Hungarian armed forces are being reduced and transformed into a professional army. The abolition of conscription is an eventual goal.”¹⁹⁸ However, this raises the question of economics. In 1999, Hungary spent only 1.9% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense.¹⁹⁹ This is well below “European NATO’s 2.1% average.”²⁰⁰ Thus, with severe material and personnel problems, especially in the area of non-commissioned officers- “the backbone of a modern army-“ the issue of who will pay arises.²⁰¹ Who should foot the bill, NATO, in particular the United States (US), or Hungary, itself, which currently has a weak economy?²⁰²

Furthermore, two other related issues are modernization and interoperability. Most of Hungary’s military equipment is of former Soviet origin, manufacture, design, and technology. Currently, Hungary is attempting to replace its inventory of MIG-29 fighter jets with the United Kingdom and Swedish “Gripen-type fighter jet.”²⁰³ However, it has only leased 14 of these from Sweden and does not receive them until 2004.²⁰⁴ Thus, their Air Force is behind those of most NATO members, which poses several issues regarding multi-national

¹⁹⁷ Teleki, p. 2.

¹⁹⁸ *Hungary: Republic of Hungary*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁹ *Hungary Military 2000*, p. 1.

²⁰⁰ Simon, Jeffrey, *The New NATO Members: Will They Contribute?* April 1999. Accessed at www.ndu.edu on 28 May 2002, p. 5.

²⁰¹ Roskin, *NATO: The Strange Alliance Getting Stranger*, p. 4.

²⁰² *ESDP: Three Voices, One Vision*. Volume 2, Number 8. Nov. 15, 2000. Accessed at www.csis.org on 3 June 2002, p. 4.

²⁰³ *Hungarian Pilots To Train In Canada*. Canadian Press, 26 March 2002. Accessed at web.lexis-nexis.com on 28 May 2002, p. 2.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

operational interoperability, in not only the Air Force, but all other forces as well. Chief among these is digitization.²⁰⁵

Digitization is “the application of information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ timely data throughout the operational area” of the modern battlefield.²⁰⁶ It is designed to “release soldiers from the constraints of traditional military organization, offering shared situational awareness and information dominance (superior ability to access and manipulate information),” and is the heart and soul of the US Army’s Modernization Plans or Force XXI.²⁰⁷ In other words, it allows command structures, units, weapons systems, and soldiers to fight, sustain, and deliver accurate/precise firepower faster, and more lethally, than ever before with minimum exposure and massing of forces. Thus, in this realm, the US is far ahead of Hungary and most of its NATO allies, creating significant problems.²⁰⁸

First, non-digitized units cannot keep up with digitized units.²⁰⁹ Second, they may not be able to communicate effectively, creating hazardous situations for digitized units, in that non-digitized units cannot monitor their locations and may mistake them for the enemy, thus increasing the chance of “fratricide.”²¹⁰ Third, non-digitized units “with lower operating tempos, lethality, and survivability are more likely to become enemy targets.”²¹¹ Fourth, “fire support coordination and operations in a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) environment will be

²⁰⁵ Zanini, Michele, and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *The Army and Multi-National Force Compatibility*. (RAND Publications 2000) Accessed at www.rand.org on 3 June 2002, p. 20.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

particularly challenging tasks.”²¹² Finally, protecting digitized information on incompatible systems poses a significant issue in the realm of security leaks. Thus, it is clear that the technology gap that already exists between the US, Hungary, and other NATO allies as well, will continue to grow and “exacerbate current coalition problems- technically, operationally, and politically- and will prove more challenging than in the past.”²¹³

Despite these problems, however, Hungary is a staunch supporter of the US, NATO, and European integration. As a member of the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic), Hungary maintains, according to Geza Jeszenszky- the Hungarian Ambassador to the US, “the objectives of Visegrad are to prepare [the member] countries to meet the challenges of integration and to provide a useful framework to achieve that goal.”²¹⁴ Furthermore, “these countries each have sound trans-Atlantic credentials and want to participate in the building of a Europe that is a strong and reliable partner and ally of the [US].”²¹⁵ Next, the Hungarian Minister of Defense, Gyo Keleti, sees NATO enlargement and EU enlargement “as inseparable elements of the same process.”²¹⁶ Thus, Hungary would clearly like to see NATO expansion and a European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) built with US and NATO involvement. Additionally, Hungary’s economy is growing.

²¹² Ibid., p. 23.

²¹³ Ibid., p. 25.

²¹⁴ *Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic: deputy Foreign Ministers to Mark 10-Year Cooperation, Discuss Trans-Atlantic relations.* March 30, 2001. Accessed at www.csis.org on 03 June 2002, p. 2.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Keleti, Gyorgy, *Defense Integration: A Hungarian View.* Accessed at www.csd.org on 09 June 2002, p. 2.

"Hungary now boasts the most foreign investment in the region and is one of the European Union's frontrunners for accession."²¹⁷

In conclusion, despite Hungary's military deficiencies, it provides NATO and Western Europe a good jumping-off point for operations in the Balkans, and the near and middle-East, as long as access is granted by other countries. Furthermore, it enhances "emotional security" against an unstable Russia. As Stephen J. Blank asserts, "while Europe's smaller states fear Russia, the larger states distrust it."²¹⁸ Additionally, this stance is reiterated by Michael Roskin who states that, "the horror inflicted by Russian artillery on Grozny [Chechnya], should make us pause and ask if this sort of mentality lurks not far under the surface of Moscow's security establishment."²¹⁹ Furthermore, he states, "the Russian combination of brutality and [current] military weakness suggests that..." NATO enlargement is a good thing despite the inadequacies of new members.²²⁰ This is a sound assessment for not only the US and NATO, but the European Union as well.

NATO enlargement and EU enlargement in the region enhance the chances of maintaining stable democracies, especially in Hungary. "In former socialist countries, democratic civilian control of the armed forces was not part of the Cold War political agenda; democratic principles do not have strong roots in [the] region."²²¹ Thus, Hungary is having difficulties reforming its military and

²¹⁷ Teleki, p. 3.

²¹⁸ Blank, Stephen J., *The Trans-Atlantic Security Agenda: A Conference Report and Analysis*. December 2001. Accessed at www.carlisle.army.mil, p. 32.

²¹⁹ Roskin, *NATO: The Strange Alliance Getting Stranger*, p. 6.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Keleti, p. 1.

bringing it fully under civilian control.²²² NATO is a major influence in bringing this change about. Hence, NATO and EU involvement in the region are critical to stabilization of the democratic process and a mitigating force against ethnic nationalism.²²³

-Poland:

According to the Polish Ministry of Defense, Poland has 189,341 military personnel in general, with a Combined Forces Europe (CFE) limit of 234,000.²²⁴ These forces are organized into three components: Land, Sea, and Air, and have the mission of "protecting the country's independence, ensuring security of the state and maintaining the integrity of national borders."²²⁵ Like the United States (US), Poland's President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and "appoints the commanders of the branches of the military and the Chief of the General Staff."²²⁶ He exercises his authority through the Minister of National Defense.²²⁷

The Land Component of the Polish Armed Forces is "divided into operational and territorial defense units [centered] in the Pomeranian and Silesian Military Districts."²²⁸ It is comprised of "two corps (four divisions)...with seven independent brigades, including an airborne cavalry and airborne assault brigade."²²⁹ This component totals roughly 200,000, with approximately 35,000

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Gyarmati, Istvan, *Central Europe and NATO Enlargement*. Accessed at www.csdr.org on 09 June 2002, p. 3.

²²⁴ *Military Personnel In The Year 2000*. Accessed at www.wp.mi.pl on 16 March 2002.

²²⁵ Gluth, David and Joe Halisky, *Czech Republic and Poland Trip Report*, 15 April 2001, p. 6.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

officers, 25,000 warrant officers, and 120,000 soldiers.²³⁰ Its mission, in wartime, is to repel airborne and ground strikes through "active defensive operations."²³¹ In peacetime, elements of these forces participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.²³²

"The Polish Air and Air Defense Forces (AADF) have the wartime mission of repelling an enemy air strike and peacetime mission of monitoring national air space."²³³ They consist of approximately of 50,000 personnel, which maintain roughly 220 aircraft, 30 stationary rocket launchers, and 250 radar stations.²³⁴ Their equipment is a compilation "of former Warsaw Pact fighters and fighter-bombers including the MIG-21, MIG-23, MIG 29, and SU-22."²³⁵

The Polish Naval Component is comprised of approximately 14,000 sailors and maintains roughly 150 ships and 85 aircraft.²³⁶ This component provides "for the defense of the Polish maritime border," through the execution of costal defense operations, and the protection of Polish shipping in territorial waters.²³⁷ Recently, "the United States has provided the Polish Navy with two frigates and two helicopters."²³⁸

Other units in the Polish inventory include the following "Special Units-" the 1st Special Regiment from Lubliniec and the Operational and Mobile

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., p. 7.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

Reconnaissance Group (GROM).²³⁹ The 1st Special Regiment from Lubliniec is a commando unit that specializes in “activities behind the front line [to include], espionage, data collection, reconnaissance, defensive raids, and hostage rescue.”²⁴⁰ GROM was founded in 1990 and molded after the British Special Air Service (SAS) and the US Delta Force.²⁴¹ Its activities include: reconnaissance, sabotage, and hostage rescue missions.²⁴² Since its inception, it has participated in missions in Haiti (1994) and the former Yugoslavia.²⁴³

On March 12, 1999, Poland became a member of NATO “with general public support.”²⁴⁴ It did this for several reasons. First, Poland believes that “NATO grants protection from a whole range of potential and changing risks” to include “economic instability and political unpredictability east of Poland.”²⁴⁵ Second, “Poland is convinced, based on the experience of two wars, that the [US] should remain ‘a European superpower,’” in that the US linkage to Europe is crucial for a “Euro-Atlantic community and the basic element of the current European and global order.”²⁴⁶ To this end, “safeguarding the [US’s] long-term involvement in Europe remains one of the canons of Poland’s foreign policy.”²⁴⁷ In support of this position, Poland remains one of the highest contributors to NATO by maintaining a defense budget between 2.5 and 2.3 percent of Gross

²³⁹ *Polish Armed Forces: Other, Special Units*. Accessed at www.wp.mi.pl on 16 March 2002, p. 1.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Gluth, p. 6; and from *Poland In NATO: Overview*. Accessed at www.polishworld.com on 28 March 2002, p. 5.

²⁴⁵ *Poland In NATO: Overview*, p. 5.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

Domestic Product (GDP), which has been higher than some other European NATO member countries and higher than "European NATO's 2.1% average."²⁴⁸ Additionally, Poland has participated in operations in the Balkans including SFOR, KFOR, and AFOR operations.²⁴⁹ Finally, Poland has intensified, deepened relations with its eastern neighbors through the establishment of joint battalions with Lithuania and the Ukraine and has also promised two brigades to NATO's rapid reaction force.²⁵⁰

In regards to ESDI, Poland believes "that strong ties between Europe and the [US] are not in conflict with aspirations toward the development...[of NATO]... of a so-called European Security and Defense Identity."²⁵¹ Furthermore, it also maintains "building this identity should help increase the responsibility and contribution of Europeans as part of the Alliance [NATO] and help maintain trans-Atlantic links."²⁵² Thus, Poland clearly believes, unlike some other Europeans, namely France, that ESDI must be linked to NATO or built within NATO.

In conclusion, Poland is a strong supporter of NATO and the US. Clearly, it has aspirations of becoming a major contributor to not only NATO, but to European security as well. However, it has several major obstacles to overcome, namely in the area of military equipment and personnel. As "an officer from the Silesian Military District" stated, "while Poles 'are not that bad-language-wise,'

²⁴⁸ Simon, Jeffrey, *The New NATO Members: Will They Contribute?* (April, 1999) Accessed at www.ndu.edu on 28 May 2002, p. 5.

²⁴⁹ Gluth, p. 7.

²⁵⁰ Marshall, Rick, *Poland's Onyszkiewicz Sees US Preserving NATO Cohesion*. (27 January 1999) Accessed at www.fas.org on 28 May 2002, p. 2.; and Simon, p. 5.

²⁵¹ *Poland In NATO: Overview*, p. 9.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

they 'are behind as far as equipment goes.'²⁵³ Their tanks and airplanes are technologically inferior to those of NATO and other Western European nations.²⁵⁴ Furthermore, as the Polish economy grows, personnel retention and recruitment is becoming a major issue.²⁵⁵ Polish pilots "have been departing in droves" from the Polish Air Force.²⁵⁶ However, despite these difficulties "it is conceivable that Poland will more than match Spain and will become a serious NATO military contributor of security..."²⁵⁷

-Czech Republic:

According to the Czech Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic are comprised of Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Territorial Defense Forces.²⁵⁸ "The Ground Force headquarters...[is]...directly subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic."²⁵⁹ The Air Force, combined with the Ground Forces, comprise the primary combat power of the Czech Republic.²⁶⁰ The Air Force's mission is to defend Czech airspace and, since the Czech Republic's integration into NATO in 1999, has executed this mission within the NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINDAS).²⁶¹ "The Territorial Defense Troops are intended to ensure the combat and mobilization readiness, and war deployment of the Army of the

²⁵³ Simon, p. 3.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ *The Army of the Czech Republic*. Accessed at www.army.cz on 24 June 2002.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

Czech Republic...[and]...defend and protect the assigned territory and population" [of the Czech Republic].²⁶²

The Ground Forces are comprised of Immediate Reaction Forces, Rapid Reaction Forces, and Main Defense Forces.²⁶³ The Immediate Reaction Forces are composed of the 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade.²⁶⁴ The Rapid Reaction forces are comprised of the following units: 2nd Mechanized Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, 6th Combined Rocket Launcher Regiment, 11th Military Intelligence and EW Brigade, and the 1st Signal Brigade.²⁶⁵ The Main Defense Forces are comprised of the following units: 3rd Training and Mobilization Base, 1st Artillery Training and Mobilization Base, 1st Engineer Training and Mobilization Base, 6th Training and Mobilization Base, 12th Training and Mobilization Base, and the 1st Chemical Training and Mobilization Base.²⁶⁶ Both the 2nd and 7th Brigades are combined arms brigades "having a fixed organization and are assigned to fulfill tactical, and in special cases, operational and tactical missions in a formation of operational grouping or independently."²⁶⁷ Both of these brigades have participated in operations in the former Yugoslavia and have working relationships with other national military units such as the 10th Mechanized Division of the Polish Army, the 12th Tank Brigade of the Slovak Army, and 92nd Infantry Regiment of the French Army.²⁶⁸

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ *The Army of the Czech Republic-Ground Forces*. Accessed at www.army.cz on 09 June 2002.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ *The Army of the Czech Republic-7th Mechanized Brigade and the Army of the Czech Republic-2nd Mechanized Brigade*. Both accessed at www.army.cz on 09 June 2002.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

The “operational level directly controlling the [Czech] Air Force units and formations is represented by Air Force's Headquarters.”²⁶⁹ The main units it commands are the following: 32nd Tactical Air Force Base, 4th Tactical Air Force Base, 33rd Helicopter Air Base, 6th Air Transportation Base, and the 34th Training Air Force Base.²⁷⁰ All these units are equipped with Soviet era airframes and helicopters to include, but not limited to, the SU-22 M4, MIG-21 MF, and the MI-24D.

The Territorial Defense Forces are subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic.²⁷¹ Their missions include, as previously stated, preparation of the main defense forces for deployment. They are also responsible for the mobilization of the reserves, although, not much information is readily available on this topic.²⁷²

With only three brigades, the Czech Army is not a large organization and is bound by certain problems indicative of other former Soviet-Block countries. First, is their defense budget. In 1998, the Czech Republic's “defense budget was 1.12 billion USD [United States Dollars] and represented 1.8% of GDP” [Gross Domestic Product].²⁷³ This was significantly lower than Western “European NATO's 2.1% average.”²⁷⁴ However, in 2001, the defense budget

²⁶⁹ *The Army of the Czech Republic-Air Forces*. Accessed at www.army.cz on 09 June 2002.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ *The Army of the Czech Republic-Territorial Defense Troops*. Accessed at www.army.cz on 09 June 2002.

²⁷² *Ibid.*

²⁷³ *Czech Republic-Defense Market*. Accessed at www.factbook.ro on 25 June 2002.

²⁷⁴ Simon, Jeffrey, *The New NATO Members: Will They Contribute?* (April, 1999) Accessed at www.ndu.edu on 28 May 2002, p. 5.

was expanded to 2.2% GDP, exceeding the 2.1% average.²⁷⁵ Yet, problems remain to upgrade Czech forces to NATO standards.

First, for example, is upgrading of former Soviet equipment such as the T-72. Due to poor manufacturing tolerances on the main gun barrel, each tank has a different, even though minute, bore size. Hence, it is difficult and expensive to emplace a modern target acquisition and fire control system, further complicating NATO interoperability.²⁷⁶

Second, is an aircraft upgrade problem. According to Rob Cameron, the Czech Republic must replace its existing fleet of Soviet Era fighters by 2003.²⁷⁷ As of 2001, the Czech Republic had a contract with Boeing to build 72 L-159 aircraft with a Czech company in which Boeing had a 38% controlling interest.²⁷⁸ However, there is no market for the aircraft and the Czech Republic expected Boeing to promote the airframe on the worldwide market for them. Obviously, this was not a good investment for Boeing and NATO "officials have said that they do not think the Czech Republic needs new supersonic fighters at present."²⁷⁹

The third problem is English language training and proficiency. The official language of NATO is English. In order for an officer to be qualified to interact with NATO, he must achieve a STANAG 3 level of proficiency in the

²⁷⁵ *Czech Republic*. Accessed at www.countries.com 25 June 2002.

²⁷⁶ Gluth, p. 8.

²⁷⁷ *US Aircraft Manufacturer's Meet with Kavan in US*. Accessed at www.archiv.radio.cz on 24 June 2002.

²⁷⁸ Gluth, p. 7.

²⁷⁹ *Deal Falls To BAE/SAAB*. Dated May 25, 2001. Accessed at Europe.cnn.com on 24 June 2002.

language.²⁸⁰ In 1997, it was estimated that only 112 Czech officers had achieved this level.²⁸¹ Although the US Army supports English language training, officers who receive the training leave the military for the civilian sector.²⁸²

The final problem is the defense industry. "The defense industry in the Czech Republic is being fully privatized."²⁸³ However, as in the case of the L-129 aircraft, it is running into the problem of finding export markets for its products. Furthermore, "uncomfortably high fiscal and current account deficits could be future problems."²⁸⁴

In regards to the Common European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the Czech Republic wishes to participate.²⁸⁵ In February 2000, the Czech Defense Minister stated "we want to participate in the process of planning [a] European Security and Defense Identity from the very beginning."²⁸⁶ Furthermore, he indicated, through his rhetoric, that ESDI should not develop outside of NATO's purview.²⁸⁷

The Czech Republic has a long way to go before it becomes fully integrated with NATO. Its failings in regards to modernization, interoperability, industry, and language are indicative of the problems all new NATO members are facing. However, through sound policies and NATO support, these problems

²⁸⁰ Mortkowitz, Siegfried and Jiri Kominek, *Army Can't Speak NATO's Language*. (June 25, 1997) Accessed at www.europeaninternet.com on 24 June 2002, p. 2.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² From Mortkowitz, p. 1, and Gluth, p. 8.

²⁸³ Necas, Petr, *Changes and Growth in the Czech Defense Industry*. Accessed at www.cedr.org on 24 June 2002.

²⁸⁴ *Czech Republic*.

²⁸⁵ *CR and Norway Want To Find Their Place Within ESDI*. (Dated February 16, 2000) Accessed at www.army.cz on 24 June 2002.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

are not insurmountable. The incorporation of these countries into NATO adds political, if not economic, stability to the region and further advances NATO.

-Summary:

It is clear that the emerging former soviet-block countries desire to join NATO as well as the EU and thus support both ESDI and NATO. However, their integration into NATO and furthermore the EU creates significant challenges. Chief among these is funding for equipment upgrades, training, and force structure maintenance, competing with national economic infrastructure development. Additionally, the many regional/ethnic problems create a quagmire for not only these countries but also for NATO, the EU, and the United States, with potentially disastrous consequences for all if not handled correctly. To police these difficulties, should one flare badly, NATO, in particular the United States or Canada, would be the best choice for mitigating the situation, as many western European countries would not be viewed as "honest brokers" based on prior history.

V. Conclusions- Making Sense of It All

Chapters I and II demonstrate clearly that the EU and NATO are bound, like Siamese twins at the hip, with the issue of European Security. Accordingly, neither can do without the other. However, is one organization better equipped to handle the modern security battlefield than the other is? Clearly, the answer is yes, NATO. ESDI and the EURRF is an emergent phenomenon that will not be stopped, and should not be. Theoretically, it is a good thing for both NATO and the EU. However, due to the current state of affairs- divergent European opinions, unclear command structures, force over- allocations/commitments, shrinking defense budgets, majority decision-making, and, quite simply, reliance on NATO structures- ESDI and the EURRF has along way to go. Furthermore, it is clear that ESDI must develop within NATO, or in close coordination alongside it, to avoid not only collapse of the NATO Alliance but, possibly, ESDI itself.

Therefore, the current NATO, US, and UK policies of encouraging ESDI and the EURRF is the correct policy in this writer's opinion, as long as it does not lead to an ESDI that is wholly independent of NATO. Furthermore, the US must continue to exercise patience when dealing with the EU, and perhaps grant concessions when they do not overly conflict with US national interests. Where these compromises can be made lies remain to be seen, as both NATO and the EU continue to evolve.

Chapters III and IV demonstrate that ESDI, the EURRF, and NATO enlargement both enhance and detract from European cooperation and integration, as well as transatlantic integration and cooperation. This finding is consistent with much of the research conducted on the formation of the EU itself. In fact, it is consistent with many of the current integration theories, which espouse that competition, domestic-politics, and bargaining lead both to competition and closer cooperation. However, the real test truly lies in the future of all the institutions discussed.

In the words of one prominent scholar, the EU is placing much of its prestige and political, as well as military, clout behind the successful formation and eventual deployment of the EURRF.²⁸⁸ Clearly, the EU, and even NATO, both appear to be working fervently towards that goal. However, once the goal is reached, will the EURRF be a viable force if deployed?

Based on the research, it is doubtful, under the current conditions. Many have called the Eurocorps a “paper tiger” and it appears that the “Headline Goal” will be reached by 2003, but it is still unclear if this will happen in actuality or on paper. If on paper, the implications for both the EU and NATO, as they are now linked, might well be disastrous for both if the Eurocorps were to be deployed and fail tragically. Europe would lose much prestige, and NATO and the US would be put in the compromising position of doing nothing or bailing the EU out,

²⁸⁸ In-class discussion with Dr. Donald Puchala at the University of South Carolina, Fall 2002.

with the implications of either option being possible calamity for NATO, depending upon the nature of the situation and environment at the time.²⁸⁹

Furthermore, it is apparent that ESDI may look good on paper, but reality is another matter. As Chapter IV abundantly demonstrates, force interoperability, language issues, and defense industry cooperation as well as regional/ethnic issues further convolute the issue. However, the information contained within this paper is enough to conclude that the US should currently maintain its posture of dialogue and not let the EU fail too badly, if it should fail with ESDI and the EURRF, as the ramifications could be disastrous for both, depending on the situation.

On a final note, it is perhaps conceivable that ESDI and the EURRF are nothing but a mere ploy by the EU to maintain access to NATO resources and in particular US funding. What better way to bargain with a superpower than to instill the fear of going independent and acting autonomously? Surely, this is a much better tactic than totally withdrawing from NATO or trying to force the US out of the EU's affairs directly. Fear is a powerful motivator, and the fear of the EU acting autonomously in military affairs, in certain situations, is a realistic concern based on recent prior history in the former Yugoslavia. Perhaps NATO expansion, despite the physical, political, and economic difficulties, is the only viable US counter to this fear, thus ensuring greater US and EU interdependence in the end.

²⁸⁹ Idea of "paper tiger" came from: *Euro Armies "Paper Tigers"- NATO Boss*. Accessed at www.news.bbc.co.uk on 20 April 2002.

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